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THOMAS P. DUFFY· 
Professor Jay Katz, in his provocative book The Silent World of 
Doctor and Patient,l describes a poignant encounter with a patient, 
Iphigenia Jones, a young woman with a circumscribed breast malig­
nancy (p. 90). Her case is used to scrutinize problems posed by medi­
cal authority and to address critically physicians' demands for trust 
that their esoteric knowledge mayor may not require. The case mate­
rial in the book revolves around the near sacrifice of Iphigenia's breast 
through the performance of an ill-advised mastectomy. To Professor 
Katz, this surgical procedure appears to represent both the height of 
odiousness for its mutilation of the human body and the nadir of the 
medical profession's recognition of the universal themes of uncertainty 
and ignorance in their scientific corpus. Surgical removal of Iphige­
nia's breast is averted when the surgeon explains to the patient the still 
unresolved controversy surrounding management of breast cancer in 
the medical profession. Iphigenia elects a lumpectomy, without re­
moval of the breast, which bears no scars to mar her future entrance 
into marriage. She is plucked from sacrifice by a happenstance con­
versation with her surgeon, an encounter that Professor Katz portrays 
as virtually absent from medicine; even when it occurs, it falls far 
short of the idealized conversation he believes all patients desire and in 
which they deserve to be engaged. 
The choice of the name Iphigenia is an allusion to the classical 
myth concerning the near sacrifice of the daughter of Clytemestra and 
Agamemnon. The sacrifice, deceitfully advertised as an impending 
marriage to Achilles, was an act demanded of Agamemnon by the 
gods in order to permit the beached Greek fleet to set sail for Troy. It 
is only through the intervention of other gods that Iphigenia is saved 
from her wedding/sacrifice and transported to the land of Tauri. Aga­
memnon is subsequently killed by his wife upon his victorious return 
from Troy; his death a punishment and apt retribution for attempting 
* Professor of Medicine, Yale University; Attending Physician, Yale-New Haven 
Hospital; B.A., St. Peters College, 1958; M.D., Johns Hopkins University, 1962. 
I. J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984). 
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the ultimate anti-paternalistic act by sacrificing his own child. The lov­
ing bonds and responsibilities of parenthood were lower priorities for 
Agamemnon than his reputation as a leader and his avaricious need to 
conquer Troy. 
Iphigenia Jones in The Silent World of Doctor and Patient is a 
symbol of the maiming and sacrificing of patients by physicians from 
antiquity to the present time. According to Katz, the deliberate fail­
ure of physicians to engage their patients in conversation and informed 
consent is a re-telling of the Iphigenia myth. Such deceit deprives pa­
tients of what Katz perceives as the most important element of the 
doctor-patient relationship-self-determination in the patient's choice 
of medical options. In depriving patients of this autonomy, Katz con­
tends, the medical profession has persisted in a paternalistic stance by 
sometimes acting in the best interests of patients without their consent. 
This paternalism, which Katz perceives as paralleling physicians' fail­
ure to enter conversation with their patients, is more offensive and 
threatening to him than the choice of a bad medical outcome by the 
patients (pp. 90-100). 
The myth of Iphigenia is an apposite but ironical metaphor for 
the current assault on the medical profession. Physicians are accused 
of using deceit to seduce patients to participate in their sacrifice to 
medical investigation and to shore up the faltering structure of physi­
cian omnipotence and omniscience.· The patient and doctor are not 
considered united in the common purpose of restoring health but dis­
united by the specter of unilateral decisions and paternalism on the 
physician's part. Katz's new myth places the highest priority upon the 
process of medical decisionmaking and not upon the outcome; in this 
realignment, trust in the physician to strive for the optimal medical 
outcome is sacrificed to patient autonomy. Agamemnon was killed for 
attempting to sacrifice his own daughter; but paternalism is the basis 
for Katz's indictment of the medical profession. This Agamemnon­
like fate is ill-considered and tragic for the profession and society. 
The failure to engage in conversation is the stake upon which 
Professor Katz impales the profession of medicine throughout the 
book. His polemic is buttressed by excerpts from the annals of experi­
mental heart transplantation, with Christiaan Barnard's monologue 
serving as a model of physician manipulation and misguidance of the 
patient (pp. 131-41). Most of his examples of physician deceit focus 
upon the controversial surgical handling of breast malignancies (pp. 
125-84). Katz's silent world is restricted predominantly to the sur­
geon and patient with little attention paid to conversation which oc­
curs with the internist, the nursing staff, or other patients with the 
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same illness. His patients are almost always in the hands of surgeons 
without any corresponding description of the journey which brought 
them there. He describes a tragedy that unfolds with only two charac­
ters on stage, the patient and the unfettered villain-surgeon. Where is 
the chorus which comments upon misaction and points out the uncer­
tainty that is common, though not universal, in medicine? 
The world of medical care is not comprised of just surgical suites 
and unpremeditated cutting. Surgery represents an infrequent punctu­
ation in health care delivery and is rarely chosen without the consulta­
tion and counsel of a non-surgeon. Because surgeons usually do make 
surgical recommendations, it is the responsibility of the referring phy­
sician to determine the appropriateness and extent of these recommen­
dations and counsel the patients accordingly. Katz depicts the patient 
as a solo journeyer through the threatening maze of medicine without 
the patient encountering a trustworthy Diogenes in the form of a phy­
sician or non-physician. There is a singular absence of the family phy­
sician who engages in conversation over a prolonged period and 
establishes the backdrop of trust against which the discussion of thera­
peutic options and interventions takes place. This emissary of the pa­
tient engages in dialogue as part of the detente between internist or 
family physician and surgeon. The patients' primary physician, their 
Diogenes, represents the patients in professional conversations in 
which each party leans against the other. In this fashion, the physi­
cian may guide the patient through the complexities of diagnosis and 
treatment in fulfillment of the patient's trust and confidence in the 
physician. Because there have been lapses in the system and because 
the public is being encouraged to act autonomously, little attention is 
paid by Katz to this system of checks and balances. He flatly rejects 
any authoritative role of the physician with his misguided paternalism, 
and encourages the patient, after engaging in conversation, to decide 
on his own. This is not a propitious re-orientation of medicine; it is a 
denial of medicine's strengths and a patient's vulnerability. 
But Agamemnon's fate for the physician is today a popular stance 
espoused by the legal profession and ethicists. According to these 
groups, the failure to engage in conversation vitiates informed consent, 
and without informed consent there is loss of autonomy, the animus of 
the doctor-patient relationship. No physician would be so foolish or 
so arrogant as to deny the importance of conversation with patients 
and their informed consent; what is contested is the pre-eminence of 
autonomy over medical outcome, of self-determination over the norms 
of medicine. Exploration of Professor Katz's position helps clarify as­
pects of this contest for both the patient and physician. 
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Central to Katz's thesis of conversation are his roots in psychoa­
nalysis and his recommendations that both the patient's conscious and 
unconscious needs must be addressed for truly informed consent to 
occur. Such inner knowledge of the patient may be attained by the 
analyst over years and by the primary physician over a lifetime, but 
this ideal is beyond the realistic reach of most physician encounters 
with patients. In its stead, the physician relies upon the body of 
knowledge which constitutes the corpus of medicine and which defines 
the biological and clinical norms which have classically been the end 
of medicine.2 In his enthusiasm for conversation and informed con­
sent, Katz has found it necessary to debunk this scientific basis of 
medicine and to present it as having no underpinnings of certainty. 
His friendly contempt of the science of medicine echoes the charges 
frequently applied to psychoanalysis where a one-on-one visage consti­
tutes the total therapeutic relationship; this intensity of gaze, where 
the world is the doctor and patient, is not the provenance of the non­
analyst. Other physicians incorporate conversation into the several 
components of their craft; knowledge of the patient is coupled with 
knowledge of biological norms. Just as most psychiatrists are trained 
in neurology and internal medicine in order to recognize organic con­
tributions to mental disease, the non-psychiatrist is trained to recog­
nize the converse. Katz's model of the doctor-patient relationship 
appears to blur the distinction between the two groups; this is a disser­
vice to both members of the relationship. While Katz admits that his 
views of the doctor-patient relationship are colored by his psychoana­
lytic background, he errs in universalizing the analyst's stock-in-trade 
to the remainder of the medical profession and in finding them want­
ing when such skills are not in evidence. 
The medical profession does not assert that conversation is a bar­
rier in the path of informed consent and patient autonomy; all would 
agree that Professor Katz's call for dialogue is an ideal to obtain. The 
impasse is created by the strictness of the demand for autonomy of the 
patient and for rejection of medical paternalism.3 The doctor no 
longer knows best and is accused of arrogance if he or she adheres to 
that adage and acts in a patient's behalf. The profession is guilty of 
hubris in the eyes of society, a remarkable fall from grace and a dra­
matic shift in the tradition of medicine. This situation has occurred in 
the face of awesome accomplishments in technology and therapy 
2. Clements & Sider, Medical Ethics' Assault Upon Medical Values, 250 J. A.M.A. 
2011-15 (1983). 
3. Callahan, Autonomy: A Moral Good, Not A Moral Obsession, HASTINGS CENTER 
REP., Oct. 1984, at 40-42. 
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which ironically have contributed to the criticism surrounding the 
doctor-patient relationship. Paternalism was tolerable when the art of 
medicine was not overshadowed by the science of medicine, when the 
outcome of the therapeutic relationship was not dramatically altered 
by the physician's intervention and when paying attention to another's 
needs in illness was the core of the caring relationship. Doctors are 
now portrayed as adversaries engaging in sinister practices on their 
patients; all doctor-patient encounters are couched in terms of medical 
experimentation wherein patients need to be protected by protocol and 
informed consent. 
This perception represents a loss of honor for a profession which 
once was thought to possess moral authority and discretion. These at­
tributes and powers belonged to the members of the medical profes­
sion because good health was a shared value of both patient and 
physician. The restoration of health constituted the ethos of medicine; 
physicians' knowledge and wisdom permitted them the authority to 
advise and instruct patients about illness. Affixed to this medical im­
perative was a devotion or calling; a charisma that made them 
uniquely suited to aid their patients. Beneficence, with some paternal­
ism, was valued over patients' rights and some patient autonomy was 
sacrificed in exchange for the knowledge, expertise and authority of 
the physician. 
In a society in which many forms of traditional authority have 
been attacked and destroyed,4 it is not surprising that Agamemnon's 
fate would befall the medical profession. Paternalism with its authori­
tative stance is incompatible with total autonomy and with an ethos of 
medicine based on patients' control over what is done to their bodies. 
Katz has correctly attacked paternalism for lacking respect for the 
civil rights of others, a cardinal offense in a world now focused upon 
liberty of the individual and thoroughgoing self-determination. The 
public is also justified in challenging the failure of medicine to gain 
better control of the reign of technology and to place a higher priority 
on quality of life rather than maintenance of life. Physicians have 
been guilty of permitting a gross imbalance to develop in the therapeu­
tic ratio of the art and science of medicine; their ranks have lacked 
wise healers of prescience and power to resist seduction by so much 
scientific promise. At the same time, physicians have been guilty of 
imposing their relative values upon patients as absolutes, and directing 
care from an aloof and authoritarian stance. The call to discard the 
4. R. SENNET, AUTHORITY (1980). 
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mantle of medicine has found a receptive audience in a patient popula­
tion that has been cloaked by the suffocating structure of medicine. 
But does respect for total patient autonomy represent the most 
appropriate response to the hubris of the medical profession? Should 
beneficence and altruism be rejected outright because of the taint of 
paternalism? Is thoroughgoing self-determination an appropriate 
ethos for the profession of medicine? Katz's description of the doctor­
patient relationship is one in which there is a dispassionate exchange 
of information between a physician and client-similar to consulting a 
lawyer or an accountant. The depiction is one dimensional, with inad­
equate attention paid to the attending role of the physician and the 
sometimes shattered role of the patient. This is especially important in 
the circumstances in which suffering and pain in the course of an ill­
ness might determine a patient's decision to prematurely halt therapy.s 
Here, the danger of autonomy is a double edged sword because of sub­
tle but real attitudinal changes on the part of both physician and pa­
tient. The physician is the individual in our society who witnesses the 
trajectory of illness and dying over a broad terrain; he or she can use 
that experience to anticipate and advise regarding the outcome of ill­
ness. The physician has traditionally stood by and suffered with pa­
tients in an attempt at sustaining them in the agony of illness. It is a 
paternalistic act wherein the physician decides that the patient should 
not give up, that the trajectory of the illness will have a positive out­
come. Within a climate of strict patient autonomy, the fight may be 
less spirited or not even embarked upon by the doctor. Similarly, the 
patient may make decisions that are dictated by the concerns and fears 
of the moment, exactly the circumstances under which autonomy and 
prudent decision making break down. 6 The desolation of a moment 
may lead many patients to choose an unnecessary, albeit autonomous, 
death; illness makes it near impossible to know what one does not 
know. 
The flight from paternalism may have additional negative impacts 
upon medicine. Caring for the sick carries with it the risk of acquiring 
diseases. Tuberculosis was a commonplace interlude in the lives of 
many physicians of an older generation. Hepatitis and AIDS pose a 
similar risk. Patient autonomy obviously would not eliminate risk tak­
ing but it would change the guise with which such attention was of­
5. Siegler, Critical Illness: The Limits ofAutonomy, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 
1977, at 12-15. 
6. Jackson & Younger, Patient Autonomy and "Death with Dignity": Some Clinical 
Caveats, 301 NEW ENG. J. MED. 404-08 (1979). 
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fered to patients. The receipt of patients' trust and the entrustment of 
their lives to physicians' care made risk taking part of what contrib­
uted to the elevation of the physician's role in society. The willingness 
to act on behalf of another human being, especially at the risk of one's 
own life, may weaken as the commitment to patient autonomy grows 
stronger. Before rejecting paternalism, our society should ponder 
these considerations. 
Other physicians and ethicists have also addressed the limitation 
of the autonomy model; the invitation to wed medicine to libertarian 
philosophies has not gone without serious attack. Eric Cassell has 
found the autonomy model lacking because he believes that autonomy 
evolves out of the healing relationship as the patient is restored to 
wholeness by a return to health.7 Obviously autonomy cannot func­
tion as the cornerstone of the doctor-patient relationship if the impact 
of disease on personal integrity results in the patient's loss of auton­
omy. Katz's autonomous patients stand in contradiction to the pa­
tients for whom most physicians care and recognize. Another 
dimension lacking in the autonomy model is its fixation upon proce­
dure rather than substance. Callahan describes it as a minimalist ethic 
that fails to recognize human relatedness and the moral ecology of our 
lives in society.s It is also a model which is strictly rooted in Ameri­
can culture and not applicable to the rest of the world; informed con­
sent and personal autonomy are almost impossible goals in societies in 
which most medical choices are not options for all patients.9 Most 
importantly, the autonomy model fails to recognize the complex reali­
ties of medicine, the fashion in which diagnoses are made, the inability 
and/or the unwillingness of some patients to seize responsibility for 
their decisions and the attractiveness of being able to trust another 
human being when one is ill. \0 As Eric Cassell explained, illness robs 
patients of their autonomy. What he describes is the phenomenon 
well known to most physicians and documented by studies among pa­
tient populations: the patient desires to be informed and educated by 
his doctor but, in the majority of cases, wishes the physician to make 
the choice of therapy. Paternalism exists in medicine, not as some evil 
perpetrated by the profession upon the patient, but rather to fulfill a 
need created by illness. In assuming such a posture, the physician 
7. Cassell, The Function 0/Medicine, HASTINGS CENTER REP .• Dec. 1977, at 16-19. 
8. Callahan, Minimalist Ethics: On the Pacification 0/Morality, HASTINGS CENTER 
REP., Oct. 1981, at 19-25. 
9. O'Neil, Paternalism and Partial Autonomy, 10 J. MED. ETHICS 173-78 (1984). 
10. Lidz, Meisel, Osterweis, Holden, Marx, & Munetz, Barriers to In/ormed Consent, 
99 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 539-43 (1983). 
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does not wrest some right from the patient but supplies with care what 
illness has made wanting. The cry to install autonomy in its place 
appears to ignore the reality and sadness of illness. 
There are other models of the doctor-patient relationship if one 
rejects paternalism and autonomy as the core of this relationship. Pro­
fessor William May has written inspirationally on the model of the 
covenant in medicine where gift, fidelity and promise are the con­
course of the doctor-patient relationship. I I He re-orients the tradi­
tional covenant which exists among doctors and calls for a re­
definition of the covenants between doctors and their patients. 12 
Under May's covenant, doctors would perceive the richness in their 
roles from being patient-oriented rather than profession-oriented. 
Mays' call for a patient-centered medicine would receive universal as­
sent; the means of attaining that goal is what constitutes the debate. 
His own theological mantle may be a bit too pious for medicine to 
wear, however, and may fail because it attempts to fioat a secular pro­
fession on a religious course. 
Physician-philosophers Clements and Sider have challenged 
loudly the autonomy model and would substitute the return of medical 
norms to a clinical ethic as the primary issue in medical care.13 They 
argue that autonomy causes an abandonment of the value of the pa­
tient's best interest and an abandonment of the value system of 
medicine; the strength of their disdain for the autonomy model is re­
vealed in their characterizing it as an unethical act in the doctor-pa­
tient relationship. The primacy of patient choice is considered by 
them to be "philosophically inadequate, professionally damaging, and 
clinically harmful."14 Clements and Sider are polar opposites to 
Katz's posture. Their call for making the medical imperative the 
moral imperative would certainly make them candidates for Agamem­
non's fate in some circles. 
No single model or orientation appears to do justice to the com­
plexities of the doctor-patient relationship and the infinite number of 
variables that affect it. The difficulty is heightened by the many per­
spectives that its critics bring to the controversy; the elephant and the 
blind men are confronting the dilemmas in peoples' lives. Professor 
11. See May, Code. Covenant. Contract or Philanthropy, HASTINGS CENTER REP., 
Dec. 1975, at 29-38. 
12. See generally W. MAY, THE PHYSICIANS COVENANT, IMAGES OF THE HEALER 
IN MEDICAL ETHICS (1983). 
13. Sider & Clements, The New Medical Ethics: A Second Opinion, 145 ARCHIVES 
OF INTERNAL MED. 2169-71 (1985). 
14. Id. 
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Katz brings his psychoanalytic plea for conversation and his legal bias 
for informed consent and autonomy. Many lawyers favor contract as 
the basis of medical ethics, while philosophers condemn this strictly 
legalistic model of the doctor-patient relationship.15 Another law pro­
fessor, Robert Burt, depicts the profession as Janus-like with oscilla­
tions between beneficence and maleficence. 16 Professor May 
incorporates his theological background into the covenant. Physician­
philosophers Clement and Sider are resolute in the centrality of the 
clinical ethic while Pellegrino focuses on the existential condition of 
the patient. 17 Thomasma would have the physician's conscience as the 
essential determinant of the doctor-patient relationship. IS Each ob­
server speaks passionately and eloquently with compelling aspects to 
each argument. The censorious examination of the doctor-patient re­
lationship forces the profession to re-define its ethos in modern times 
by answering its critics but still maintaining its standards. 
All would agree that a patient-centered medicine is the essence of 
the doctor-patient relationship and that the profession exists to save 
patients rather than the reverse. Professor Katz has performed a very 
important service with his clarion call for conversation with patients, 
an investment that only can give the patient the leading role in any 
doctor-patient relationship. Informed consent and truth telling are es­
sential to maintaining the trust and confidence of the patient in this 
moral relationship; this relationship also demands a mastery of knowl­
edge of the body that is the basis of the clinical norms which Clement 
and Sider have as their beacon. This scientific knowledge is the source 
of authority and expertise in the physician's role. But what is tran­
scendent in the role is that special moral imperative that pervades 
every encounter in the doctor-patient relationship. As described by 
Professor Kass, medical knowledge is not dispensed with an ethically 
neutral technique but is an activity tempered by a notion of the good. 19 
Every medical act involving a patient is an ethical act with the end of 
medicine always being beneficence; the moral imperative of benefi­
cence is the backdrop against which any medical imperative is per­
15. Master, Is Contract an Adequate Basis for Medical Ethics?, HASTINGS CENTER 
REP., Dec. 1975, at 24-28. 
16. R. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RULE OF LAW IN DOCTOR-PA­
TIENT RELATIONS (1979). 
17. E. D. PELLEGRINO, HUMANISM AND THE PHYSICIAN (1979). 
18. Thomasma, Beyond Medical Paternalism and Patient Autonomy: A Model of 
Physician Conscience for the Physician-Patient Relationship, 98 ANNALS OF INTERNAL 
MED. 243-48 (1983). 
19. See generally L. KASS, TOWARD A MORE NATURAL SCIENCE: BIOLOGY AND 
HUMAN AFFAIRS 211-23 (1985). 
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formed. This has been the ethos of medicine from ancient times to the 
present. 
This beneficence may include paternalistic acts on the part of the 
physician when the circumstances dictate; when autonomy is present 
or restored, there will be no need for this contribution to patients' 
needs because of ill-advised ethical or legal enthusiasm for autonomy. 
Rather, it should examine closely any propensity to overstep the au­
tonomy of patients and welcome the policing of the legal and ethical 
profession in that task. In the doctor-patient relationship, the medical 
profession should always err on the side of beneficence. Professor 
Katz and his colleagues should continue to lean against this posture of 
the profession. In the tension created, the imperatives of medicine will 
smack of paternalism when autonomy restoration is the goal. A poor 
medical outcome should not be allowed to evolve due to a respect for 
autonomy. What Professor Katz has guaranteed in his model is that 
medical imperatives should not dictate endless support of life or cloak­
ing of ignorance or uncertainty. With this response, the medical pro­
fession should avoid the imposition of Agamemnon's fate, and should 
attain a proper end of medicine in a world of the doctor and patient ­
a world which is no longer silent. 
